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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
     here were essentially two reasons why the modern international humani-
tarian law (IHL)/law of armed conflict (LOAC) began its development in 
the middle of the nineteenth century, one commendably idealistic and the 
other profoundly pragmatic. The first was about altruistic concern for basic 
humanity in relation to the treatment of the victims of war. It resulted in 
the creation of the Red Cross movement and the series of Geneva conven-
tions, the first of which was agreed in 1864. It also produced the first inter-
national agreement in modern times prohibiting the use of a weapon for 
reasons of humanity, the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration.1 That Declaration 
has been followed by a variety of treaties aimed at banning or restricting 
the use of weapons that fail to comply with the now well-established cus-
tomary principles of humanity and distinction.2  
The second reason was driven by the selfish—or national—interests of 
the most powerful States; it resulted initially in the 1856 Paris Declaration, 
the essential purpose of which was to secure freedom of navigation on the 
high seas for commercial shipping, specifically to ensure the continuation 
of extremely lucrative maritime trade in time of war.3 The debate over the 
importance of the freedom to continue trading activities at sea during war 
became politically significant, not least in Britain, the pre-eminent naval 
and maritime trading power, where commercial trading interests out-
maneuvered the naval lobby in influencing diplomatic negotiations to do 
with the regulation of warfare at sea. While trading interests invariably 
sought to protect freedom of movement on the high seas, naval interests 
were more concerned with the purposes of naval warfare, which included 
                                                                                                                      
1. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, available at  
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId
=568842C2B90F4A29C12563CD0051547C. 
2. See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 70, 71 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL Study]; Steven Haines, 
The Developing Law of Weapons: Humanity, Distinction and Precautions in Attack, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 273, 289–91 (Andrew 
Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014). 
3. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 15 Mar-
tens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 791, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW SUPPLEMENT 89 (1907). 
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applying economic pressure on opposing belligerents through the interdic-
tion of their maritime trade (including that carried in neutral shipping). 
Even with the acknowledgement of neutral rights, economic warfare at sea 
necessitated a certain amount of navigational disruption that threatened 
commercial interests in general. As a consequence, there was significant 
tension between naval and commercial shipping interests during the period 
of intense globalization in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, 
and this helped form the political context for pre-First World War devel-
opments in the IHL/LOAC applicable at sea.4 One of those developments 
was concerned with the legal regulation of the sea mine.  
Sea mines are extremely effective sea-denial weapons. Opposing navies 
in time of conflict are locked in a basic struggle for sea control, the attain-
ment of which allows them to conduct other operations, to project naval 
power ashore and to interdict enemy trade (the principal ways in which na-
vies bring their influence to bear on the wider conflict). They achieve sea-
control for themselves through operations that deny it to their opponents. 
Sea-denial weapons have become especially important in modern naval 
warfare through technological developments since the nineteenth century, 
reducing, though by no means eliminating, the need for major set-piece 
battles between opposing surface forces. Submarines, maritime airpower 
and shore-based missiles all pose significant threats to surface naval forces. 
Prior to their arrival as a factor in naval warfare, however, came the sea 
mine.  
Naval forces are extremely vulnerable to damage from mines and no 
responsible naval commander will willingly take his force into waters where 
they are known to have been laid without first deploying countermeasures. 
Relatively small numbers of mines can seriously curtail the operations of a 
large and otherwise powerful naval force. Sea mines have notable asymmet-
ric effects.  
Of course, mines are not merely sea-denial weapons causing problems 
for opposing navies. They are also an excellent means of disrupting an en-
emy’s maritime trading activities, including preventing merchant shipping 
entering an enemy’s ports. Indeed, as shall be seen, it was this use that was 
the most significant during the two major naval wars of the twentieth cen-
                                                                                                                      
4. For recent and important works on this subject, see NICHOLAS A. LAMBERT, 
PLANNING ARMAGEDDON: BRITISH ECONOMIC WARFARE AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
(2012); JAN M. LEMNITZER, POWER, LAW AND THE END OF PRIVATEERING (2014); STE-
PHEN COBB, PREPARING FOR BLOCKADE 1885–1914: NAVAL CONTINGENCY FOR ECO-
NOMIC WARFARE (2013). 
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tury. They can also be used defensively to deny access to a belligerent’s (or 
a neutral’s) coast and ports by the naval forces of the enemy, as well as in a 
protective sense to secure shipping routes by preventing both enemy sur-
face ships and submarines using those waters.5  
Perhaps surprisingly, the only treaty to date dealing with the regulation 
of sea mines is now over a century old. The 1907 Hague Convention VIII 
Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines6 was aimed 
at regulating a weapon that seriously threatened both major surface war-
ships and merchant ships. It was a response to the then available technolo-
gy, principally mines triggered by direct contact with the hull of a ship. Au-
tomatic submarine contact mines were—and remain—relatively simple de-
vices. Even today, while there are certainly far more sophisticated mines 
capable of being targeted at specific types of vessel—or even individual 
ships—through their reaction to such influences as pressure, sound and 
magnetic signature, a substantial proportion of sea mines are still triggered 
by contact. So, although over a century old, the Convention governs a 
weapon still in broad circulation and still a significant asymmetric threat to 
all maritime forces, including blue water navies. 7 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to assess the 1907 Convention from 
a twenty-first century perspective. I start with background briefs on the 
historical context (both developments in sea mines prior to 1907 and the 
wider backdrop to the conference in The Hague), which leads into a de-
scription of the content of the 1907 Convention, followed by an account of 
relevant practice and other developments since 1907.   
                                                                                                                      
5. See the discussion in SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE 
TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 169–70 (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995). The San Remo 
Manual is an important document in relation to the law regulating sea mines and it will be 
the focus of specific comment below. 
6. Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact 
Mines, Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332. 
7. Contact mines are common, the Chinese and Iranians being just two interesting ex-
amples of States possessing them. For a discussion of Chinese mining capabilities, see 
Andrew S Erikson, Lyle J Goldstein & William S. Murray, Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA 
Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability, 3 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES, no. 3, June 2009, available at 
https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Publications.aspx (then China Maritime Study No. 
3 June 2009 hyperlink). For a discussion of Iran’s mining capability, see Fariborz 
Haghshenass, Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE (Sept 2008), 
www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus87.pdf; Martin 
Wählisch, The Iran–U.S. Dispute, the Strait of Hormuz, and International Law, 37 YALE JOUR-
NAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ONLINE 22 (2012), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-37-
waehlisch-the-iran-u.s.-dispute.pdf. 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEA MINES PRIOR TO 19078 
 
Sea mines were probably first used during the siege of Antwerp in 1584–
85, but it took almost another two hundred years for any serious develop-
ment of this means of warfare. The release of floating kegs of explosives 
upstream of British naval vessels in the Delaware River was proposed by 
David Bushnell during the American War of Independence (1775–82). 
They proved to be largely unsuccessful on that occasion due to the vigi-
lance of lookouts on the British ships. Another American, Robert Fulton, 
tried to convince both the French and the British during the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars (1793–15) that their opponent’s ships could be sunk 
using towed explosives. Neither side took his idea up, however, apparently 
because each regarded sea mines as a barbaric and unethical means of war-
fare.9  
These first attempts to develop weapons that would damage the hulls 
of enemy ships produced devices whose operation was more akin to what 
are now referred to as “torpedoes” and, indeed, that term rather than 
“mines” was often used to describe them. The first use of a weapon similar 
to what would now be described as a sea mine occurred during the Crime-
an War (1853–56), when the Russians used them as a means of harbor de-
fense in both the Baltic and the Black Sea. Designed by Moritz von Jacobi 
and Immanuel Nobel (father of Alfred), they were triggered automatically 
on contact with a ship’s hull by means of a chemical fuse. They were not a 
great success in terms of their explosive effect. One exploded under the 
                                                                                                                      
8. No original research has been undertaken to inform the account of the historical 
development of sea mines that follows. Rather, the account relies heavily on two works in 
particular that are arguably essential references for the entire discussion of sea mines: 
HOWARD S. LEVIE, MINE WARFARE AT SEA (1992) and JAMES J. BUSUTTIL, NAVAL 
WEAPON SYSTEMS AND THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF WAR 12–100 (1998). Additional 
references are the useful commentaries included in the two relevant collections of docu-
ments: DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 103–4 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 
3d ed. 2000) and Howard S. Levie, Commentary, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COL-
LECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 140 (Natalino Ronz-
itti ed., 1988). Unless quoting directly from these sources, in order to reduce the number 
of footnotes no repeated reference will be made to them hereafter in discussions of histor-
ical developments.  
9. It is interesting to note this Napoleonic era concern with humanity in the conduct 
of war, predating the formal introduction and development of what is now recognized as 
weapons law by half a century—or even a full century if the Hague conferences in 1899 
and 1907 are regarded as the true birth of IHL/LOAC weapons law.  
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British warship HMS Merlin, but did not do any real damage.10 The first 
ship to be sunk by a naval mine was the USS Cairo, sunk on the Yazoo 
River in Mississippi in 1862 during the American Civil War. That mine was 
not activated by contact with the ship’s hull, but by a command wire ar-
rangement operated from the shore.11 That arrangement certainly meant 
that that particular mine was capable of discrimination in targeting. The 
contact mine, however, was inherently indiscriminate in its effect, being 
unable to distinguish between warships and merchant vessels. By design, 
therefore, it represented a profound threat to free navigation, including on 
the high seas and, if laid in significant numbers and in wide areas, had the 
potential seriously to undermine maritime commercial trade. For that rea-
son, influential trading interests would be in favor of banning or greatly 
restricting its use. At the same time, States began to consider regulation for 
entirely pragmatic reasons based on national interests. Since mines were 
also capable of inflicting serious and widespread injury to those serving in 
the ships that fell victim to them, there was an additional idealis-
tic/humanitarian rationale for limiting their use.  
 
III. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR 1907 HAGUE 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, idealistic and pragmatic tendencies 
influencing the developing IHL/LOAC had begun to coalesce. In 1899, 
through the personal initiative of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, a conference 
was convened in The Hague, the principle purpose of which was to limit 
armaments. It resulted in three conventions and three weapons-related dec-
larations. Only one of these documents was directly related to naval war 
(1899 Hague Convention III,12 which extended the provisions of the 1864 
Geneva Convention13 to war at sea). The priority at that point was regulat-
ing war on land.  
Wars between great powers during the nineteenth century had been 
many and varied (contrary to the modern myth that Europe was relatively 
                                                                                                                      
10. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO SHIPS AND THE SEA 549–50 (Mines and Mine 
Warfare) (Peter Kemp ed., 1976). 
11. Rob Hoole, The Development of Naval Mine Warfare,  MINEWARFARE & CLEARANCE 
DIVING OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION,  www.mcdoa.org.uk/development_of_minewarfare.h 
tm (last visited May 13, 2014). 
12. Convention No. III for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of 
the Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1827, 1 Bevans 263. 
13. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in the Armies 
in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361. 
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peaceful from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the outbreak of the 
Great War in 1914).14 They had also frequently included naval engage-
ments. What there had not been, however, was a general great power war 
of sufficient intensity and duration that naval war in all its manifestations 
had become a decisively significant part of it. There had been no major and 
sustained confrontations between great power navies since the early nine-
teenth century.  
General, multinational great power wars have been the engines of 
change for many international developments in the modern era. Their ab-
sence, and the limited nature of the naval campaigns during the lesser great 
power wars that were fought in the decades following 1815, meant both  a 
paucity of sufficient State practice to generate shifts in the customary law 
of naval war, and  a lack of a motive born of experience to generate posi-
tive change through the development of treaty law. It should be no sur-
prise, therefore, that the 1899 Hague Conference devoted so little time to 
naval issues.  
That conference was to have been the first of a series of peace confer-
ences. While the second conference met in 1907, the next, envisaged for 
1914 or 1915, was not convened because of the outbreak of war between 
the European great powers. In fact, the 1907 Hague Conference had antic-
ipated such a war and, importantly, had also expected it to involve a major 
naval confrontation. There were two reasons for this. First, in between the 
first and second conferences, there occurred a substantial war between two 
major powers that had a significant naval dimension. Second, there was a 
growing expectation that the next great power war involving European 
powers had the potential to feature a major naval war because of the naval 
arms race between Britain and Germany and the notable rise in naval capa-
bilities generally.  
Significantly, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 had a substantial mari-
time dimension, most strikingly leading to the deployment of a Russian 
fleet from the Baltic to the Far East, where it was famously defeated at the 
Battle of Tsushima by the Imperial Japanese Navy commanded by Admiral 
                                                                                                                      
14. There were fourteen wars involving great powers in Europe between 1815 and 
1914. See SANDRA HALPERIN, WAR AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN EUROPE: THE 
GREAT TRANSFORMATION REVISITED 6 (2004). It is arguably the case that those who 
were alive in 1914 were somewhat less surprised by the outbreak of war that summer than 
some eminent historians writing about the subject a century after (although the former 
would have been greatly surprised by its duration and effects). 
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Togo Heihachiro.15 The war sent shockwaves through the international sys-
tem at the time, not least because it resulted in an Asian power defeating a 
European great power. It understandably raised the profile of naval war 
considerably. When coupled with the growing Anglo-German naval antag-
onism marked by an intense naval arms race, naval war was placed firmly 
on the international diplomatic agenda.16  
The Russo-Japanese War’s most notable naval engagement was un-
doubtedly the Battle of Tsushima, the most significant fleet engagement 
since Trafalgar, exactly a century earlier. The bulk of the Russian fleet that 
fought in that battle had sailed halfway around the world to do so. It was 
deployed for that purpose as a reaction to the sinking off Port Arthur on 
March 31, 1904 of the Russian flagship, the Petropavlovsk, which also result-
ed in the death of Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov, the charismatic, 
courageous and immensely popular commander of Russian naval forces in 
the region, whose decapitated body went down with his flagship. Petropav-
lovsk was not the victim of conventional ship-to-ship combat—it had been 
struck by a Japanese automatic submarine contact mine. The German Kai-
ser wrote to Tsar Nicholas to express his “sincerest and heartfelt sympathy 
to you at the loss of so brave an admiral, who was personally well known 
to me—and so many brave sailors.”17 Masses were celebrated to the 
memory of Makarov across the Russian Empire. Sea mines were not get-
ting a positive press in Russia. Elsewhere, those States with substantial sur-
face fleets were awakened to the potential destructive impact of the weap-
on and the vulnerability of the substantial investment their fleets of war-
ships, in particular the considerable number of “dreadnought” battleships, 
represented.  
Throughout the war, mines were laid by and affected both belligerents. 
The Russians laid a minefield off Port Arthur which cost the Japanese two 
of their battleships, four cruisers, two destroyers and a torpedo boat. At the 
same time, merchant shipping was being disrupted, with mines seriously 
impeding their free navigation. This caused the British—and other neu-
                                                                                                                      
15. For a recent study of naval aspects of this war, see CONSTANTIVE PLESHAKOV, 
THE TSAR’S LAST ARMADA: THE EPIC VOYAGE TO THE BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA (2002). 
16. For accounts of the naval rivalry between these two powers, see, e.g., PAUL M. 
KENNEDY, THE RISE OF THE ANGLO-GERMAN ANTAGONISM 1860–1914 (1980); ROB-
ERT K. MASSIE, DREADNOUGHT: BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND THE COMING OF THE GREAT 
WAR (1991); MATTHEW S. SELIGMANN, THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE GERMAN THREAT: 
ADMIRALTY PLANS TO PROTECT BRITISH TRADE IN A WAR AGAINST GERMANY (2012). 
17. PLESHAKOV, supra note 15, at 34. 
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trals—considerable concern, with commercial trading interests bringing 
their influence to bear on the British government’s policy as the second 
Hague Conference approached.18 That 1907 conference came to be heavily 
focused on maritime concerns. Of the total of fourteen conventions pro-
duced at the conference, nine were devoted to aspects of war at sea. The 
eighth was that dealing with automatic submarine contact mines, the type 
of mine that had caused substantial damage to both sides during the Russo-
Japanese War.  
So, by 1907, sea mines had become a focus of serious concern and at-
tention. Commercial trading interests tended to want them banned alto-
gether, while naval interests wanted them regulated, but also saw the value 
of them as sea-denial weapons and as a means of disrupting enemy trade. 
Commercial interests in Britain were influential and attempted to persuade 
the government to overrule naval opinion and to push for an outright ban. 
The Royal Navy’s influence was not inconsequential, however. The British 
position evolved to favor tight restrictions on mining activity, but there was 
no attempt to arrive at an outright ban, not least because this was never 
likely to be achieved during treaty negotiations. The most predictable out-
come of the 1907 Conference would be a balanced agreement, regulating 
the use of potentially indiscriminate sea mines, but certainly not banning 
them altogether.  
 
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF 1907 HAGUE CONVENTION VIII 
 
The 1907 Convention consists of a preamble and a total of thirteen articles. 
Only the first five articles posit the rules governing the characteristics of 
those mines permitted and the ways in which they should be used; all five 
will be considered. Article 6 covers action to deal with those existing mines 
that were contrary to the Convention (this will not be considered in detail 
here, given its limited relevance today). Article 7, which covers the Conven-
tion’s application (restricting it to situations in which all belligerents are 
party), will also be examined. Articles 8 through 13 will not be commented 
upon as they deal with ratification and other procedural matters. In discuss-
ing each of the relevant articles, no detailed account is given of the traveaux 
                                                                                                                      
18. This and follow-on developments in the law governing naval operations was re-
flected subsequently, for example, in debate between Royal Navy officers in the pages of 
their professional journal, The Naval Review. See Steven Haines, Law, War and the Conduct of 
Naval Operations, in DREADNOUGHT TO DARING: 100 YEARS OF COMMENT, CONTROVER-
SY AND DEBATE IN THE NAVAL REVIEW 299, 301–3 (Peter Hore ed., 2012). 
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préparatoires. Levie has already adequately discussed the drafting process for 
each of these articles and it is not considered necessary to repeat his ac-
counts or explanations in what follows below.19  
 
A. Preamble 
 
It is worth considering the Preamble as it makes a number of important 
points as to the purpose of the Convention, raising questions as a result. 
The Preamble made it very clear it was inspired by the desire to keep sea 
routes open for some navigation, while going on to stress that it was about 
regulating rather than banning the use of automatic submarine contact 
mines.  
Both the title of the 1907 Convention and the Preamble refer to “au-
tomatic submarine contact mines.” The operative articles omit the word 
“submarine” when referring to the mines that are the focus of the text. 
There is a simple reason for this. If a moored mine slips its mooring it will 
float to the surface. A moored mine’s normal location in the water column 
will be below the surface at a depth that will lead to contact with a passing 
ship’s hull. It will not be visible, reducing the chances of a target vessel 
avoiding it, but will remain effective in achieving the necessary contact with 
the vessel. Indeed, the moored mine will also ensure that the target vessel is 
holed below the waterline. The 1907 Convention clearly needed to cover 
the possibility of moored mines floating to the surface, however, hence the 
operative articles omitting the word “submarine.”  
By defining the type of mine covered by the 1907 Convention, it did 
not apply to sea mines in general. As Busutill has pointed out, “the spheri-
cal, ‘horned’ contact mine [is] triggered by the contact of a passing ship 
against one of the ‘Hertz’ horns . . . [the] type of mine to which Hague 
Convention VIII is addressed.”20 As noted above in the discussion of the 
historical background, there were other mines in existence that were trig-
gered in other ways than by contact; they were excluded from considera-
tion. This is an important point to acknowledge, because, if the Conven-
tion agreed in 1907 had covered all devices then capable of being described 
as sea mines, this would have given some credence to the view that it cov-
ered all forms of sea mines subsequently developed. As influence mine 
technologies advanced in subsequent years, the 1907 Convention would 
                                                                                                                      
19. See the relevant sections in LEVIE, MINE WARFARE AT SEA, supra note 8, at 27–50. 
20. BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 15–16. 
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have also applied to them. By dealing very specifically with contact mines 
and excluding other mines that then existed, however, the Convention is 
arguably not extendable to other, subsequent, mines utilizing newer tech-
nologies. This is not, however, uncontentious. While Kalshoven believed 
that the wording of the 1907 Convention effectively excluded other mines, 
O’Connell in contrast suggested that, despite the wording of the rules 
agreed in 1907, “it does not mean that the principle behind them is irrele-
vant . . . . [it] has rigidified in recent times so as to encompass the influence 
as well as the anchored contact mine.”21 This clearly raises questions as to 
how customary law has developed since 1907, an issue to which I return 
briefly below when discussing Article 1 of the Convention.  
The compromise articulated within the Preamble recognized the im-
possibility of obtaining a total ban on automatic submarine contact mines, 
while acknowledging the vital importance of using mines in a way that did 
not have a profound adverse effect on “peaceful navigation” along the 
principal trading routes. Such navigation was not defined in the Conven-
tion, however—did it allude merely to that by neutral vessels or also to bel-
ligerent vessels carrying non-contraband cargo? This question was not an-
swered. Peaceful navigation was also, arguably, not guaranteed, but was 
only to be ensured “as far as possible.” The intention of the Convention 
was stated as being to “mitigate the severity of war” and not to eradicate 
mining altogether in such a way as to ensure freedom of navigation at the 
expense of belligerents’ rights to conduct hostilities at sea.  
Compromises, by definition, will never entirely satisfy all concerned. 
Britain, prompted by its influential trading interests, eventually and predict-
ably had to agree to less regulation than it would have liked, but stated in a 
reservation that “the mere fact that this Convention does not prohibit a 
particular act or proceeding must not be held to debar (Britain) from con-
testing its legitimacy.”22 
 
B. Article 1  
 
To quote Levie, “[Article 1] unquestionably contains the most important 
provisions of the Convention and the only ones that place any real re-
strictions on the use of mines by belligerents as an incident of maritime 
                                                                                                                      
21. FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR (1987); 2 D. P. 
O’CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1138 (Ivan A. Shearer ed., 1984); 
both quoted in BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 63–64. 
22. THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 8, at 132. 
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warfare.”23 The article is divided into three paragraphs. The first forbids the 
laying of unanchored automatic contact mines unless they are constructed 
in such a way that they become harmless within an hour after the person 
laying them ceases to control them. The second forbids the laying of an-
chored automatic contact mines unless they become harmless as soon as 
they break loose from their moorings. The final paragraph forbids the use 
of torpedoes that do not become harmless when they have “missed their 
mark.”  
The first paragraph is effectively acknowledging the existence and utili-
ty of a form of defensive mine designed to be released from a ship being 
pursued by an enemy warship, the intention being that the mine would 
float into the path of the pursuing warship and cause it either to end its 
pursuit or to be damaged when it came into contact with the mine. The 
U.S. Navy has referred to these as “drifting mines” and itself developed six 
types between 1915 and 1925 (and a further Mark 7 during the Second 
World War), for example.24 Although these sorts of mines were usually 
launched from the deck of the pursued vessel, they could be towed behind 
it, ready to be slipped free to float into the path of a pursuing enemy war-
ship when required. Such mines could well be in the water under tow for 
extended periods while remaining under the control of the vessel launching 
them. Once launched/slipped they became free floating. They needed to be 
active to achieve their purpose, but that was clearly time limited. The limit 
of one hour was regarded as adequate for the intended purpose and tactical 
deployment of the weapon. After that time had elapsed, the mine needed 
to become harmless, however, otherwise it would become a threat to ship-
ping generally (thereby defeating the 1907 Convention’s declared object).    
Arguably, this particular provision is now largely overtaken by events as 
these sorts of mines are generally a thing of the past. Nevertheless, the 
provision remains and should not be dismissed as entirely irrelevant for the 
simple reason that it is feasible that such a weapon might be created in the 
future. If it is, then this provision may need to be complied with (subject to 
the applicability of the treaty law or its reflection in customary law). One 
can envisage circumstances in which a navy may develop such a device or 
the ship’s company of an individual ship might extemporize during a low-
intensity coastal conflict, for example. Combatants often resort to battle-
                                                                                                                      
23. LEVIE, MINE WARFARE AT SEA, supra note 8, at 31. 
24. United States of America Mines, NAVAL WEAPONS, NAVAL TECHNOLOGY AND NA-
VAL REUNIONS, http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WAMUS_Mines.htm (updated 
Jan. 13, 2013). 
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field “invention” to respond to particular tactical threats. In Afghanistan, 
for example, junior combatants are known to have weaponized otherwise 
benign remote-controlled vehicles in order to cope with particular tactical 
challenges, quite unaware of the need to ensure that the legality of such 
weapons needs to be confirmed through legal review.25  
In relation to all three types of weapon described in Article 1, there is 
the requirement that they “become harmless.” What is meant by this 
phrase? Busuttil has identified three possibilities, indicating that a mine free 
floating for more than an hour, one that breaks its mooring or a torpedo 
missing its target, should be designed to either self-destruct, disarm or sink 
to the seabed. The last of these is perhaps the least satisfactory because an 
armed device lying on the seabed will not be absolutely harmless (it might 
be drawn into the bottom trawl of a passing fishing vessel or be activated 
by a bottoming submarine, for example). Other types of mines are de-
signed to lay on the seabed and remain intentionally active. That being the 
case, while a contact mine sinking to the seabed to become “harmless” 
might be the least satisfactory option identified by Busuttil, it perhaps re-
mains an acceptable way of complying with the 1907 Convention.  
On the other hand, if “to become harmless” means either to self-
destruct or to disarm, rather than simply sink, this would add credence to 
the view that the 1907 Convention only applies to contact mines, with in-
fluence mines lying on the seabed not affected. The development of influ-
ence mines post-dated the Convention. It is a feature of their mode of op-
eration that influence mines either rest on the seabed (ground mines) or 
they sit in position within the water column, held in place by a mooring line 
that is anchored to the seabed. Whether they are ground or moored influ-
ence mines, they remain in position to await the arrival of whatever vessel 
has the required signature to trigger them. In the practical sense, ground 
mines do not need to be physically anchored in place on the seabed. They 
do, however, tend to be restricted in their use to shallower water than 
moored mines (sixty meters—or two-hundred feet—being about the limit 
for ground mines). If the 1907 Convention was to apply to influence 
mines, then they would obviously all need to be anchored, or be obliged to 
become harmless one hour after deployment, which would make deploying 
them largely pointless.  
                                                                                                                      
25. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. Such battlefield extemporization was revealed to the author in discussion with 
a former British commander of forces deployed in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
1907 Hague Convention VIII      Vol. 90 
 
425 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dinstein has argued that there are no reasons why the Convention 
should not apply to influence mines as well; indeed, he states that this is 
what the rule “must” mean.26 While that proposition might at first not 
sound unreasonable, it is unfortunately problematic. An inevitable conse-
quence would be that, to be lawful, all influence ground mines would, once 
deployed, have to be physically held in position by some form of anchor-
ing. Many are not; they are not designed to be and it would be virtually im-
possible to modify existing mines and their manner of deployment to ren-
der them compliant with the 1907 Convention. The anchoring of ground 
mines has never been formally agreed. It cannot here be regarded as a cus-
tomary requirement since no evidence is available to demonstrate that any 
State deploying such mines has ever done so in the belief that there is a 
legal obligation to have them anchored to the seabed. There is neither the 
practice nor the opinio juris to establish a customary norm. Indeed, if any-
thing, practice indicates the opposite. The conclusion one is drawn to is 
that the 1907 Convention does not apply to mines other than those contact 
mines to which it specifically refers.  
 
C. Article 2 
 
Article 2 of the 1907 Convention forbids the laying of “automatic contact 
mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of inter-
cepting commercial shipping.” This article is somewhat ambiguous in rela-
tion to both the location of legitimate minelaying and the extent to which it 
is allowed for purposes additional to the interception of commercial ship-
ping. Instinctively, it seems to mean a blockade should not be enforced by 
the use of mines—until one deconstructs the wording. Is mining forbidden 
in ports and inland waters? Is it restricted by the use of the phrase “off the 
coast” to the territorial waters of the enemy, or might a minefield laid in 
these circumstances extend into the high seas? What about the use of 
mines in international straits in which the territorial seas of opposing bel-
ligerents meet and in which mining activities could render such straits im-
passable? On this latter point, the conference made a conscious decision 
not to address the issue because the majority of States believed they had no 
mandate to do so.27 Mining certainly occurred in ports and inland waters 
                                                                                                                      
26. Yoram Dinstein, The Laws of War at Sea, 10 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 46 (1980). 
27. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 463, 502 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013). 
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prior to 1907, but it also continued after that date. It is impossible to reach 
a clear and uncontentious conclusion to the questions raised by the word-
ing in the article if one is concerned merely with the location of a mine-
field. The wording relating to location must be read along with the intend-
ed purpose of the mining that is forbidden. 
Even then, however, the article is unsatisfactory. It seems that all a bel-
ligerent laying the mines needs to do is assert that the minefield’s purpose 
is not exclusively to intercept commercial shipping. By stating that the mine-
field is also—or primarily—about denying access to enemy warships, for 
example, the mining would not be contrary to the wording of the article. 
One could go even further. How should the phrase “commercial shipping” 
be interpreted? Elsewhere in the Convention reference is made to “peace-
ful shipping,” a phrase as already noted, is itself subject to some interpreta-
tion. Is the absence of the word “blockade” in this article of any signifi-
cance (especially given the implication to be drawn from it)? Does “com-
mercial shipping” mean all shipping, including neutral shipping and bellig-
erent commercial shipping not carrying contraband? Would belligerent 
merchant ships not carrying contraband, especially when sailing in escorted 
convoys, represent something other than the “commercial shipping” cov-
ered by the wording of the article? One could go on posing questions of 
this sort. Essentially, this article, the meaning of which seems quite 
straightforward on first reading, is shot through with ambiguity and is pro-
foundly unsatisfactory. Both Levie and Busuttil have discussed this prob-
lem in some detail. One is attracted to Busuttil’s conclusion, that the 1907 
Convention 
 
therefore forbids the laying of automatic contact mines in the internal wa-
ters and territorial sea, and on the high seas opposite the coasts and ports 
of an enemy to a reasonable distance, if the State doing so has as its only 
intent the cutting off of all commercial shipping, broadly understood. The 
mining of the ports themselves or the inland waterways of an enemy to 
carry out any intent is not forbidden by the Convention.28 
 
Given the ease with which a belligerent could assert purposes other 
than the interdiction of commercial shipping as the reasoning behind its 
minelaying activities, the restrictions contained in this article are virtually 
meaningless in any practical sense. 
 
                                                                                                                      
28. BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 25. 
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D. Article 3 
 
Article 3 establishes an obligation on those laying mines to take “every pos-
sible precaution . . . for the safety of peaceful shipping.” It then goes on to 
place on belligerents an obligation to “do their utmost to render [the] 
mines harmless within a limited time, and, should they cease to be under 
surveillance, to notify the danger zones” to ship owners and other govern-
ments.  
Aside from the issues already discussed about what is and what is not 
“peaceful shipping,” there is a question raised by the use of the two differ-
ent phrases “every possible precaution” and “do their utmost.” As Busuttil 
has illustrated very well, such terminology can be the subject of different 
interpretations. It must be said, however, that it is quite possible to become 
far too obsessed with deconstructing phrases of this sort and arriving at 
subtly different meanings, the fact that both have been used in the same 
article doing nothing to stem the tendency to assume they indeed mean 
different things. As Levie has noted, when regarded together with the 
phrase “as soon as military exigencies permit,” one is left with an article 
that is notable for its inherent flexibility, not a precise statement of clear 
obligations. Nevertheless, all such phrases do tend to provide belligerents 
laying minefields with ample opportunity either to avoid strict compliance 
or to delay it, which is unfortunate in a treaty. 
There is not much more that can usefully be said about this collection 
of phrases. Their interpretations will, inevitably, be left to those laying 
mines, with the precise meaning of “every possible precaution,” “do their 
utmost” and “as soon as military contingencies permit” being left to their 
judgment, be it good or otherwise. Ultimately, of course, a court or tribunal 
may have to reach its own conclusions against a set of pertinent facts, but 
that has yet to happen and is not currently in prospect. One suspects that 
as long as the existence of minefields is notified through such media as No-
tices to Mariners and diplomatic communications (including today by in-
forming the International Maritime Organization, the relevant UN special-
ized agency), identifying whether all other conditions have been adequately 
met will be problematic. In that sense, the article is flawed, although it is so 
because, of course, of the need to arrive at a text acceptable to those at-
tending the Hague Conference in 1907. 
Before leaving this article, there is one further comment that ought to 
be made. There is a requirement for belligerents to “render these mines 
harmless within a limited time.” What is not articulated is any sense of pre-
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cision as to what the word “limited” means. Mischievously, it might be in-
terpreted as setting a timeframe of one-hundred years—which would still 
be limited, strictly speaking. One should not be deliberately facetious. It is 
more than likely that such a period would be regarded as excessive. What 
exactly is meant, though, by this requirement of Article 3? One might be 
forgiven for assuming that “limited” suggests a matter of days or possibly 
even weeks; for most, it would certainly not suggest a number of years. Yet, 
minefields have frequently been laid for effect over extended periods, espe-
cially in the sorts of general naval wars in which the bulk of such mines 
have been used (the First and Second World Wars). Perhaps in the context 
of 1907 and the then recent experience of naval war between Russia and 
Japan, it was not unreasonable to measure timeframes in weeks or months 
rather than years. Subsequent twentieth century experience has provided 
clear evidence that time limits are almost invariably impossible to set—they 
are, after all, subject to military exigencies.   
 
E. Article 4 
 
Article 4 imposes obligations on neutral powers similar to those imposed 
on belligerents in relation to the deployment of mines. There is one im-
portant difference. Whereas Article 3 requires the laying of mines to be no-
tified to ship owners and other States at some point after the mines are laid 
(defined as being “as soon as military exigencies permit” after the laid 
mines cease being under “surveillance”), Article 4 requires neutrals to in-
form ship owners and States prior to minelaying operations being conduct-
ed. The difference between these requirements to inform is understanda-
ble. A belligerent laying mines will seek to conduct such operations unop-
posed and will not, therefore, wish to inform the enemy of its intentions, 
whereas a neutral laying mines for the security of its own waters will have 
no such need and, indeed, will probably seek to give significant publicity to 
its minelaying activities. Again, although the article does not stipulate pre-
cisely how this should be done, in practical terms the formal method of 
communicating the location of mines will be by a combination of Notices 
to Mariners and diplomatic channels (informally, of course, in the current 
age of global communication and media activity, the information is likely to 
be readily available to all concerned in very short order). 
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F. Article 5 
 
Article 5 turns to the subject of mine clearance “at the close of the war,” 
but does so in what appears to be a potentially confusing manner. There 
are two sentences in the article. The first declares that States are “to do 
their utmost to remove the mines that they have laid, each Power removing 
its own mines.” The second, seemingly contradictory, sentence goes on to 
say that in relation to mines laid by a belligerent “off the coast of the other, 
their position must be notified to the other party by the Power which laid 
them, and each Power must proceed with the least possible delay to re-
move the mines in its own waters.” So, on the one hand the 1907 Conven-
tion requires States to clear their own mines while, on the other, it requires 
them to clear the mines present in their own waters. What is to be made of 
this? 
Before dealing with the apparently contradictory content, something 
needs to be said about when this article actually applies. This is of some 
importance as it requires States to take mine clearance action “with the 
least possible delay.” In order to know when mine clearance operations 
should commence—or subsequently to judge the measure of any delay in 
their conduct—one would surely need to have some idea when the mo-
ment of obligation had arrived. The article states that this moment is “the 
close of the war,” but what, precisely, does that mean? The Convention 
does not elaborate. Notwithstanding the fact that since the middle of the 
twentieth century the term “armed conflict” has been preferred in legal 
parlance to “war” (though the two terms are not precisely synonymous), 
the phrase could be interpreted as either the suspension of hostilities 
through some form of ceasefire (though presumably a general one and not 
merely a temporary or local arrangement), the achievement of an armistice 
agreement, or even the ultimate formal termination of war arrived at 
through the signing of a treaty of peace.29 The latter could take, literally, 
years. The mere suspension of hostilities, however, will not guarantee the 
end of further resort to force, and mine clearance under those circum-
stances could well be premature. Busuttil analyses this issue (and much of 
the 1907 Convention’s meaning) by reference to the authentic French 
text.30 Unfortunately, his conclusions do not finally resolve the dilemma. In 
                                                                                                                      
29. See, e.g., the lengthy discussion about the means of terminating war in YORAM 
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF DEFENCE 34–62 (4th ed. 2005). 
30. BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 72. 
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the San Remo Manual the chosen terminology is “after the cessation of ac-
tive hostilities,” reflecting Article 118 of 1949 Geneva Convention III31 and 
Article 33 of 1977 Additional Protocol I.32 One needs perhaps to accept 
that the precise moment critique defies clear definition, but that it will eventu-
ally emerge and become clear to all sides. After that point, mine clearance 
should certainly proceed “with the least possible delay.”  
Turning now to the question of which State should remove which 
mines, although the two sentences in the article appear contradictory, they 
are not absolutely so. One can deduce from a comparison of the two sen-
tences that States have a responsibility to remove those mines they have 
laid, except for those laid in the waters off the coasts of their enemy. In the 
same vein as the comments about Article 2, the Convention does not stipu-
late what is meant by the phrase “off the coast.” To be consistent, I again 
take what Busuttil has concluded, that this includes the territorial waters of 
the State, but also the high seas out to a “reasonable distance,” and that 
there is nothing more that can be said about the geographical extent of the 
obligation.  
Finally, although Article 5 directly applies to belligerents, it indirectly 
also applies to neutrals who have laid mines off their coasts through the 
statement in Article 4 that “Neutral Powers which lay automatic contact 
mines off their coasts must observe the same rules and take the same pre-
cautions as are imposed on belligerents.” Essentially neutral States must 
clear those mines they have laid off their coasts.  
 
G. Article 6 
 
Article 6 deals with the arrangements to be taken by newly contracting 
States whose existing mines could not comply with the provisions of the 
1907 Convention. This article is now all but overtaken by events. Theoreti-
cally, it would still apply to any States that became party to the Convention 
in the future. A total of thirty-seven States signed it at The Hague in 1907, 
although only twenty of those subsequently ratified it to become parties. A 
further five States acceded to it, the last being Finland, which did so on 
December 30, 1918. Two further States, Fiji and South Africa, made decla-
rations in 1973 and 1978, respectively, that they consider themselves parties 
as a consequence of their previous status within the British Empire (Britain 
                                                                                                                      
31. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135. 
32. Supra note 25. 
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having become a party in 1909). Currently, therefore, there are twenty-
seven parties bound by its provisions and eight signatories merely bound 
not to undermine the purpose of the Convention.33 With virtually all parties 
having become so around a century ago and with the two most recent hav-
ing done so almost four decades ago, one might safely assume that no fur-
ther States will accede to the Convention, which means that this article al-
most certainly has no further practical effect.  
 
H. Article 7 
 
Article 7 declares that “the provisions of the . . . Convention do not apply 
except between contracting Powers, and then only if all belligerents are 
parties to the Convention.” This is an understandable provision reflecting 
standard treaty law, especially in relation to a treaty that is not itself a codi-
fication of existing custom. While understandable, it has had a remarkable 
effect. Since 1907 when the Convention was agreed in The Hague, there 
has been no armed conflict during which it has actually applied. If it has 
had any effect at all, therefore, it will have done so by virtue of its rules be-
coming regarded by a number of States as having achieved customary sta-
tus through a combination of practice and opinio juris since the Convention 
was agreed. This fact leads neatly to a discussion of practice, especially dur-
ing the First and Second World Wars and thereafter. 
 
V. STATE PRACTICE AND SEA MINING SINCE 190734 
 
There have been plenty of wars since 1907 to examine in the search for 
relevant State practice. Without doubt, the two world wars have been by 
far the most significant, with the first occurring less than five years after the 
1907 Convention came into force in January 1910. Apart from those two 
                                                                                                                      
33. One of the early ratifying States was Austria-Hungary (1909) which divided into a 
number of sovereign States (including the separate States of Austria and Hungary) follow-
ing the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War. 
This could raise questions about State succession, although, in effect, neither State is likely 
to have any involvement in the laying of sea mines as both are now landlocked. The same 
applies, of course, to other landlocked parties, Luxembourg and Switzerland, both of 
which became parties (in 1912 and 1910, respectively). Finally, although a further land-
locked State signed the Convention (Serbia in 1907), it then failed to ratify. See LAW OF 
NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 8, at 129–30. 
34. Again, the historical detail in what follows relies greatly on the evidence outlined 
in both LEVIE, MINE WARFARE AT SEA, supra note 8, and BUSUTTIL, supra note 8. 
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general great power wars, during which mines were used extensively by 
both belligerents and neutrals, there have been a number of other conflicts 
that have involved some use of sea mines. It is worth saying something 
about all of these, which are addressed in the following three sections on 
the First World War, the Second World War and on conflicts since 1945. 
 
A. The First World War  
 
Mining commenced immediately on the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, 
with both belligerents and neutrals engaging in the laying of extensive 
minefields in both coastal zones and across swathes of the high seas. In-
deed, as if to signal the profound significance of mine warfare, the very 
first navy on navy engagement in the war between Britain and Germany 
was fired on August 5, 1914, the second day of the war, when the German 
warship SMS Königin Luise was sunk by the British destroyer HMS Lance 
while the former was engaged in offensive minelaying operations off the 
ports of Harwich and Lowestoft.35 The following day the HMS Amphion, of 
the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla based in Harwich, struck one of the Königin 
Luise’s mines thirty-five miles east of Aldeburgh Napes. The one hundred 
fifty members of her ship’s company lost when the mine exploded, togeth-
er with an accountant officer killed during the previous day’s encounter 
between Lance and Königin Luise, were the very first casualties suffered by 
the British Empire during the First World War.36 
While rival belligerents might have been expected to engage in both 
minelaying activities and the operations to prevent them, neutral States also 
set about laying defensive minefields around their coasts. Even prior to the 
engagement between the Königin Luise and the Lance, the Dutch and the 
Danes, both neutrals, had begun mining the waters in the Baltic and its ap-
                                                                                                                      
35. PAUL G. HALPERN, A NAVAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I 27 (1994) and Len 
Barnett, A Well Known Incident Reassessed: The German Attempted Mining of the Thames in August 
1914, 89 THE MARINER’S MIRROR 185–202 (2003). I had thought this incident was the 
first shot fired in the naval war. That, however, occurred on the opposite side of the world 
a few hours before when the Royal Australian Navy fired at a German merchant ship try-
ing to exit Port Phillip Bay. That resulted in the RAN seizing a copy of the German cipher 
which proved very useful as a key to what the High Seas Fleet was up to in the North Sea 
(I am most grateful to Rear Admiral James Goldrick RAN for pointing this out to me). 
36. THE ROYAL NAVY DAY BY DAY (Anthony B. Sainsbury ed., 2d ed. 1992); Allan 
Mallinson, Churchill Struck the Decisive Blow Seven Days before the War, THE TIMES (London), 
Aug. 2, 2014, at 74, 74–75.  
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proaches on August 1 and 4, respectively. Further neutral mining was con-
ducted in the opening weeks of the war by the Ottoman Empire (which 
subsequently entered the war as a belligerent). From late September on-
wards, it laid mines in the waters off its coast in the eastern Mediterranean. 
From then on, mining by most belligerents and significant neutrals re-
mained a major feature of the naval war until hostilities ceased in late 1918.  
Extensive minefields were laid by the belligerents, with claims and 
counterclaims as to their legality under the 1907 Convention. This was de-
spite the fact that, according to Article 7, it did not formally apply because 
not all belligerents were party. Approximately a quarter of a million mines 
were laid in total during the war by belligerents and neutrals alike. Perhaps 
the most extensive minefield was that laid by the British in the North Sea 
aimed at preventing German submarines transiting from their base ports 
into the Atlantic, where their purpose was principally to sink Allied ship-
ping. A particular criticism was the indiscriminate nature of mining activi-
ties by belligerents. Claims to that effect were followed by assertions that 
responsive mining activity was merely in the nature of reprisal for the op-
posing belligerent’s indiscriminate mining that preceded it.  
In all of this, the general purpose of the 1907 Convention appeared to 
have been roundly defeated. It was not ignored entirely, however. Apart 
from occasional references to it, with claims made by both sides that op-
posing belligerents were in breach, there were hints that its detailed provi-
sions relating to the types of mines permitted and the manner of their de-
ployment were gaining at least some traction. There were demands, for ex-
ample, that moored mines should become harmless on slipping their moor-
ings and the United States, in February 1915 (when it was still neutral), 
urged belligerents not to lay any floating mines on either the high seas or in 
territorial waters. 
Perhaps the most obvious and important point to make about the use 
of sea mines subsequent to the coming into force of the 1907 Convention 
is that the desire of commercial shipping interests to limit the use of min-
ing and to ensure that trading routes remained open and safe during hostili-
ties at sea was confounded. The use of mines during the Russo-Japanese 
War had given some hint as to their potential significantly to affect mari-
time trade and the general conduct of war at sea. Experience of mining 
then was, however, nothing like as intense as that during the years of major 
naval war in the decade following the negotiation and coming into force of 
the Convention. It should be remembered that the outbreak of the First 
World War effectively brought to an end the first major period of globali-
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zation. It massively disrupted trade and the sea mine was one of the main 
reasons. Here was confirmation, if it were needed, that commercial trading 
interests in the latter years of the nineteenth century and the opening years 
of the twentieth were absolutely correct in their understanding of the po-
tential that mines had to disrupt their activities. The fact that mining had 
this effect also, of course, proved to naval authorities that they were simi-
larly correct in their assumptions about the belligerent utility of the weap-
on.  
For the overall effect and the extent to which mining practice devel-
oped during the First World War, one can do no better than quote Busut-
til’s conclusions: 
 
Naval mines were used by all belligerents and many neutrals; minefields 
were used to isolate the enemy by cutting off ocean borne supplies; mine-
fields were laid to control and regulate neutral shipping; any type of ship, 
neutral, convoyed or otherwise, that entered the minefields was liable to 
be sunk; the mined danger zones were usually notified so that ships could 
avoid them, although the danger zones were often described in a general 
way; and the protests and counter-protests concerning mining diminished 
with time and appeared to be no impediment to the proliferation of naval 
mines and the destruction of shipping which the mines caused.37 
 
B. The Second World War 
 
While the Second World War is generally regarded as having opened with 
the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, some historians regard 
it as having started earlier with such precursor conflicts as the Japanese in-
vasion of Manchuria in 1931 or the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. 
Although neither of these involved naval mine warfare, one precursor con-
flict that did was the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), which was particularly 
notable for the intervention by Germany on the side of Nationalist forces. 
Its involvement included the use of submarines to lay mines off the Span-
ish coast to prevent support for Republican forces arriving by sea. While 
the effect was not profound (only five merchant ships were hit by mines), 
minelaying by submarines in that civil war represented the first of three 
significant innovations in mine warfare that were to feature greatly during 
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the global war that followed.38 The other two were the laying of mines by 
aircraft and the deployment of influence mines, including magnetic, acous-
tic and pressure mines.  
The method used to lay mines is of absolutely no significance in the 
context of the 1907 Convention; the fact that a mine is laid by a submarine 
or by an aircraft does not mean that it is not covered by the Convention’s 
provisions. In contrast, the development and introduction of influence 
mines is of some significance, if only in the negative sense. As is argued 
above, the 1907 Convention, strictly speaking, excludes consideration of 
anything other than contact mines, which means that a considerable num-
ber of those mines deployed during the Second World War would not ap-
pear to be regulated by it. While that is acknowledged, it should not be as-
sumed that the Convention was necessarily irrelevant in all senses with re-
spect to them (something to be returned to below).   
As in the First World War, minelaying commenced immediately after 
war broke out in September 1939, with both Germany and Britain laying 
extensive minefields (using both contact and influence mines). The Ger-
man naval Commander in Chief, Admiral Raeder, announced that the lay-
ing of mines had been conducted strictly within the provisions of the 1907 
Convention, in particular pointing out that, because Britain had decided to 
place its merchant ships in convoy under the protection of warships, com-
mercial trading routes into British ports no longer existed, and that the Ar-
ticle 2 ban on the use of mines solely for the purpose of intercepting com-
mercial shipping had not, therefore, been breached.  
Both sides gave notification of their mining activities. Indeed, in De-
cember of that year Britain announced its intention to lay further fields in 
the North Sea, an advance notification not required by the terms of the 
Convention. Further mining and associated notifications followed. In Au-
gust 1940, Germany went so far as to announce a total blockade of the 
British coast, stating that the whole sea area around the British Isles had 
been mined. It would seem that the 1907 Convention’s requirement to no-
tify was being honored (regardless of the types of mines laid); presumably 
with both belligerents accepting that, as mutual parties, they would choose 
to comply with its provisions on notification. One notable breach of the 
law, however, was that committed by the British when they mined Norwe-
                                                                                                                      
38. Although there had been rumors that submarines were used to lay mines during 
the First World War. 
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gian territorial waters on April 8, 1940, four days before the German inva-
sion on April 12 (up until which Norway had remained a neutral).39  
Mines were not laid only at sea (either on the high seas or in territorial 
waters). In May 1940, for example, Churchill authorized Operation Royal 
Marine to close the Rhine to river traffic. A total of 1,184 mines were 
dropped into the Rhine and a further three hundred sixty into the Moselle 
by the Royal Air Force. By the first week in June 1940 it was reported to 
Churchill that aerial reconnaissance had shown that traffic from Karlsruhe 
to Mainz had been “totally suspended.”40  
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of war between 
the United States and Japan, mines were laid extensively by the United 
States in the Pacific theater throughout the period of hostilities to 1945. 
They were laid by aircraft, submarines and surface ships to block approxi-
mately one hundred fifty enemy ports and harbors. This included, from 
March 1945, the implementation of Operation Starvation, which involved 
the aerial laying of approximately twelve thousand mines in Japanese har-
bors with the clear intention of driving Japan to capitulation by starving it 
of the resources necessary to continue the war. 
In all there were probably as many as a million sea mines laid during 
the Second World War.  Estimates of the damage they caused are very 
rough, principally because it was often unclear whether shipping casualties 
were the result of attacks by submarines or by contact with mines. Despite 
this factor making it difficult to arrive at reliable figures for mine casualties, 
there is no denying that mines had great effect. Allied ships sunk by mines 
were estimated to number in the order of between three and five hundred; 
Axis casualties were probably over two thousand five hundred. Again, it is 
useful to turn to Busuttil for his observations on mine warfare during the 
war: 
 
First, there was only a minimal replay of the protests and counter-protests 
at mining seen during World War I. Second, mining was primarily di-
rected at the destruction of the commercial and industrial infrastructure 
of the enemy. Third, very many mines were sown, at least double and 
perhaps quadruple the number laid during World War I, Fourth, the ex-
                                                                                                                      
39. Today this would, of course, be a breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, but it 
is also appropriate to mention in the context of this discussion that it was also contrary to 
Article 2 of 1907 Hague Convention XIII. Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights 
and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415. 
40. MARTIN GILBERT, 6 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: FINEST HOUR 1939–1941, at 487 
(1983). 
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plicit use of mines to force Japan to capitulation, ‘Operation Starvation’, 
which very nearly lived up to its name, was not, and to this day has not 
been, condemned as illegal.41 
 
We can add to this that the presence of minefields was generally noti-
fied in a manner accessible to both opposing belligerents and neutrals. As 
had previously been the case during the First World War, the sheer volume 
of mines laid in the years 1939–45, together with the geographical extent of 
minefields both around coasts and on the high seas, leads one inexorably to 
the conclusion that the early twentieth century attempt to limit mining 
through the negotiation of the 1907 Convention was an abject failure. Cer-
tainly, the purpose of the Convention, as expressed in its Preamble, “to 
restrict and regulate” mining “to mitigate the severity of war and to ensure  
. . . to peaceful navigation the security to which it is entitled” seems in ret-
rospect to have been profoundly unrealistic. Arguably, the declared object 
of the 1907 Convention was defeated in the first few days of the first major 
naval campaign following its negotiation, and this was repeated just over 
two decades later in the opening days of the Second World War.  
 
C. Mining Post-1945 
 
There has been no general great power/global war involving sustained and 
extensive naval operations profoundly affecting maritime trade since 1945. 
The extensive mining that took place in both the First and Second World 
Wars has simply not been repeated. When mining has been used by bellig-
erents in the limited wars since then, it has been more to do with sea deni-
al, with their intended effect being on opposing naval forces, rather than 
about an effective means of conducting economic warfare by attacks on 
maritime trade.42  
This was certainly the case during the Korean War, between 1950 and 
1953. Mines were used by North Korea to confound United Nations’ forc-
es with some effect. The invasion of Wonsan, planned for October 1950, 
was delayed by just over a week because approximately three thousand 
mines (both contact and influence) had been laid for defensive purposes in 
Wonsan harbor. Subsequently, Chinese and North Korean forces regularly 
laid mines, which had the effect of restricting UN coastal operations for 
                                                                                                                      
41. BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 37. 
42. See id. at 38–43. 
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the rest of the war. Some of those laid were free floating or drifting mines 
and, therefore, contrary to the terms of the 1907 Convention.  
The mining of Haiphong harbor in 1972 during the Vietnam War was 
with inactive mines sown by aircraft. They were timed to activate after 
three days, allowing vessels in Haiphong to depart the port during the three 
days of grace. After the mines became active, no ships either arrived in the 
port or left it for a total of three hundred days. Although both the Soviet 
Union and China alleged the mining was illegal, they relied on the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas,43 and refuted U.S. claims that the mining 
was defensive and allowed under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The 1907 
Convention does not appear to have been referred to by either side. The 
United States regarded the mining as a successful operation and the peace 
agreement with North Vietnam followed soon after. Anchored mines that 
broke free of their moorings duly exploded, in compliance with the 1907 
Convention and the United States took action to render unexploded mines 
harmless after the war ended. 
Between 1987 and 1988 both Iran and Iraq laid mines in the Persian 
Gulf. They were a distinctive feature of the war and they certainly had a 
disruptive effect on both warships and merchant vessels. Western navies 
deployed mine countermeasures vessels to clear mines in the Gulf and, by 
the time of the ceasefire in August 1988, had discovered a total of seven 
separate minefields and had cleared approximately ninety moored and a 
similar number of floating mines. Several ships were damaged in the Gulf, 
including the U.S.-flagged tanker Bridgeton on July 24, 1987 and the USS 
Samuel B. Roberts in April 1988,44 and one tanker hit a mine eighty miles 
south of the Straits of Hormuz in August 1987. The Iranian landing-
craft/minelayer Iran Ajr was attacked and sunk by the U.S. Navy on Sep-
tember 21, 1987 while it was engaged in laying a minefield on the high seas 
in an area of restricted navigation off Bahrain. The use of unanchored au-
tomatic contact mines during this period, including by Iran deliberately 
placing them in the path of neutral merchant vessels, was clearly a breach 
of the 1907 Convention. 
Following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq laid a minefield off the 
Kuwaiti coast to deter the expected counter-invasion by coalition forces. 
The field consisted of both contact and influence mines. Several drifting 
                                                                                                                      
43. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 
U.N.T.S. 82.  
44. Following the incident involving the Samuel B. Roberts, the United States launched 
attacks on Iranian oil platforms in response. 
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contact mines were encountered by coalition naval forces, although it was 
not clear whether these had been laid deliberately to drift or had simply 
slipped their moorings and not disarmed. Either way, the mines breached 
the 1907 Convention. Two U.S. Navy vessels were struck by mines (the 
USS Tripoli struck a moored contact mine and the USS Princeton was dam-
aged by an influence mine). After the cessation of hostilities, approximately 
one thousand three hundred mines (a mix of contact and influence) were 
cleared, principally by a mine countermeasures force led by the British. The 
United States also laid mines by aircraft to hamper the operations of the 
Iraqi Navy.  
Other, relatively minor examples, of post-1945 mining operations oc-
curred during the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973,45 the Indo-Pakistan 
War of 197146 the Anglo-Argentine War of 198247 and during the very early 
stages of the Balkan Wars in 1991.48  
 
VI. CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE SAN REMO MANUAL 
 
It is the practice outlined above that must lead into some discussion of its 
effect since 1907, and to whether or not the Convention set in train a pro-
cess through which practice was influenced by it and developed into cus-
tomary law. Those looking into the development of customary 
IHL/LOAC today are, of course, almost invariably prompted to consult 
the major study of the subject carried out under the auspices of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross between 1995 and 2005.49 Unfortu-
nately, when it comes to that element of IHL/LOAC exclusively applicable 
at sea, this is not possible. The Customary International Humanitarian Law 
study avoided altogether an examination of the rules specifically governing 
                                                                                                                      
45. The Suez Canal was closed between 1967 and 1975 as a result of the two Arab-
Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973. This had a serious effect on international shipping moving 
between the Indian Ocean and Europe, adding over four thousand miles to the passage. 
See James Freyer, The 1967–75 Suez Canal Closure: Lessons for Trade and the Trade Income Link, 
VOX (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.voxeu.org/article/1967-75-suez-canal-closure-lessons-
trade.    
46. Pakistan laid a minefield in the approaches to Chittagong in East Pakistan. 
47. Argentina laid contact mines in the approaches to Port Stanley harbor and gave 
notification of the presence of the minefield in April 1982.  
48. Both Croatian and Federal forces laid mines on the Adriatic coast off the Federal 
naval base at Lora-Split and off the besieged city of Dubrovnik, respectively.  
49. The results of which were published as the Customary International Humanitarian 
Law study in 2005. CIHL Study, supra note 2. 
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the maritime aspects of armed conflict; those governing sea mining activi-
ties, were not, therefore, included. One reason frequently given for this 
(and especially in response to the criticism that this was an unfortunate 
oversight) is that the relevant law had already been comprehensively exam-
ined by a project conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (IIHL) based in Sanremo, Italy. The outcome of 
the IIHL’s project was published in 1995 as the San Remo Manual on Interna-
tional Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.50 The San Remo Manual is un-
doubtedly an extremely important reference on the IHL/LOAC applicable 
at sea. What it says about sea mines will be central to a discussion of the 
law relating to them, and leads to questions about the status of the San 
Remo rules and how were they determined. 
A number of factors prompted the IIHL to conduct its study into 
IHL/LOAC at sea. First, there had been no formal development of the law 
governing the conduct of naval operations during armed conflict since the 
Second World War which, by then, had concluded fifty years earlier (the 
only related treaty was the 1949 Geneva Convention II,51 which did not 
focus on the means and methods by which naval operations are conduct-
ed). Second, the peacetime law of the sea had developed in significant ways 
through the UN law of the sea conferences, especially the third of those 
that took place between 1974 and 1982, and which resulted in the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.52 Most significant for 
naval operations had been the Convention’s extension and enhancement of 
coastal-State jurisdiction and the formal introduction of straits transit and 
archipelagic sea lanes passage. Although the Convention was a part of what 
would traditionally have been referred to as the “law of peace,” its provi-
sions would clearly have an impact on the conduct of naval operations in 
time of war, especially in relation to neutral rights and obligations. Third, as 
noted above, there had been a number of conflicts since 1945 with naval 
dimensions that had highlighted legal issues, not least the then most recent: 
the UN-mandated operation against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait 
                                                                                                                      
50. The date of the San Remo Manual’s publication, coinciding with the start of the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross’s project leading to the Customary International Hu-
manitarian Law study, was significant in relation to the decision not to include the law gov-
erning naval operations in the latter. 
51. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85. 
52. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397.  
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in 1990, the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War and the Falklands War in 1992. An at-
tempt to develop treaty law relating to sea mines in the context of the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)53 failed to result in 
any negotiations.54 While weapons law had developed significantly, and was 
continuing to do so through the negotiation of protocols to the CCW, 
there had been no development in weapons law dealing with naval weapon 
systems since before the Second World War. For all these reasons, the 
IHL/LOAC applicable at sea was certainly worthy of some reassessment. 
The San Remo Manual was the result of a process of consultation and 
discussion between 1987 and 1994 at two round tables and six meetings of 
a group of naval experts and lawyers. Fifty-six participants, together with 
ninety-four associated experts and observers, were engaged, many of whom 
were serving naval officers and other officials.55 They represented every 
region of the world and included individuals from a significant number of 
naval powers, including each of the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council. Although they contributed to the process in their person-
al capacity (not formally representing their States), their involvement was 
often directly related to the official positions they then held in their navies 
or government departments. Successive British Chief Naval Judge Advo-
cates were engaged, for example, each handing the participation role over 
to his official successor in office as the process moved forward.  
The result of the process, published in 1995, was authoritative without 
being either an attempt to develop conventional law or account for the 
then current state of customary law. Indeed, it was innovative in several 
respects in attempting to place the law of naval operations during armed 
conflict into a late-twentieth century context. As a source of the law it is, 
therefore, somewhat ambiguous. Nevertheless, it has become a frequently 
                                                                                                                      
53.  Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137. 
54. The Convention has a series of protocols additional to it dealing with specific 
weapons, new protocols being added as deemed appropriate. A proposal for such a proto-
col, dealing with sea mines, had been advanced by Sweden in the late-1980s, but the idea 
was rejected. See BUSUTTIL, supra note 8, at 79–89, 94–97. The CCW does now include the 
1996 Amended Protocol on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices, but Article 
1(1) states that it does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland water-
ways. Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
Traps and Other Devices, May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93. 
55. See the lists of those attending the meetings in the San Remo Manual, supra note 5, 
at 46–55. 
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quoted and widely used guide as to what the law ought to say about the 
conduct of naval operations in armed conflict. In that sense, as it is con-
sulted and used for that purpose, it has been having an effect on the devel-
opment of both practice and opinio juris. It was, for example, used as the 
first draft of the chapter on Maritime Warfare in the UK’s official Manual of 
the Law of Armed Conflict published in 2004.56 Each of its rules was then re-
viewed, with those not reflecting either conventional or customary law be-
ing rejected. In the case of mine warfare, the UK’s Manual used precisely 
the wording of the relevant San Remo Manual articles (rules 80 to 92 inclu-
sive). It was British policy only to include reference in its Manual to what it 
believed to be the law. The repeating of the San Remo Manual rules on mine 
warfare can be regarded, therefore, as strong evidence that the United 
Kingdom, at least, considers them to have legal force. 
The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, an extremely important 
publication, the original purpose of which was to be an expanded version 
of the German manual on IHL/LOAC (expanded essentially by the inclu-
sion of extensive commentary), is now in its third edition, but is no longer 
“connected to a single national manual.”57 Its chapter on naval warfare in 
all three editions has been the work of Heintschel von Heinegg, one of the 
world’s foremost experts on this body of law, who was also involved in the 
project to produce the San Remo Manual as one of the project’s rapporteurs. 
It is of interest to note comments from the Handbook. On the subject of 
the customary status of the rules in the 1907 Convention, it states that 
 
apart from the problem of whether [the 1907 Convention] is of signifi-
cance for modern mines, it seems to be the correct view that [the Con-
vention) qua customary law remains a valid legal yardstick for the use of 
automatic contact mines. [The Convention] has, therefore, acquired the 
status of customary international law governing the use of automatic con-
tact mines. However, its provisions are not applicable as such to other 
modern mines. These are, it is submitted, governed by the rules and prin-
                                                                                                                      
56. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT (2004). The present author, who chaired the Manual’s Editorial Board, 
as well as being one of the authors of its Maritime Warfare chapter, has previously provid-
ed a comparison of that chapter with the San Remo Manual, relating the extent to which the 
United Kingdom utilized the San Remo rules. See Steven Haines, The United Kingdom’s 
Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict and the San Remo Manual: Maritime Rules Compared, 36 
ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 89 (2006). 
57. THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 27, at 
xvii. 
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ciples of customary international law, which also provide norms regulat-
ing the area where naval mines—whether antiquated or sophisticated—
may be employed.58 
 
While the rules contained in the 1907 Convention are regarded as hav-
ing attained customary status in relation to automatic contact mines alone, 
they have also, when combined with other elements of customary law, led 
to the devising of the rules contained in the San Remo Manual.59 They apply 
to all forms of sea mines (which are defined as “explosive device(s) laid in 
the water, on the seabed or the subsoil thereof, with the intention of dam-
aging or sinking ships or deterring ships from entering an area” 60).  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Especially in relation to mining activities and their effect during the two 
world wars, the stated and fundamental aim of the 1907 Convention con-
tained in its Preamble—“to mitigate the severity of war and to ensure, as 
far as possible, to peaceful navigation the security to which it is entitled”—
was not achieved. The Convention did not prevent the twentieth century 
increase in the use of sea mines during major war involving sustained naval 
operations. Trade was massively and intentionally affected in both world 
wars by the laying of extensive minefields in sea areas central to the war 
effort of the belligerents. The sea mine had become an influential weapon 
of war.  
Nevertheless, one should resist simply writing the Convention off as a 
completely ineffective instrument of regulation of wartime mining. There is 
certainly evidence that some provisions contained in it have been acknowl-
edged and applied—perhaps not with precision or by all belligerents in all 
circumstances, but certainly in part and to an extent that is significant. That 
in itself is a positive comment, not least when one acknowledges that the 
Convention was never actually applicable in any of the wars/conflicts 
fought during the years following its negotiation. At no time in any con-
flicts were all belligerents’ party to it and, for that reason, arguably none 
                                                                                                                      
58. Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 27, at 504.  
59. See Heintschel von Heinegg’s most recent discussion of the subject in Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg, Maritime Warfare, in  THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 
145, 162–63.  
60. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 5, at 169. The definition is not included as a rule 
itself, but is included in the commentary indicating that it was used for the purposes of 
compiling the manual.  
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were under a legal obligation to apply it as treaty law. In addition, the Con-
vention was strictly concerned with automatic submarine contact mines, 
which have never been the only type of sea mine available for use. In par-
ticular, from the outbreak of the Second World War influence mines began 
to appear and have eventually become the most sophisticated mine of 
choice for those having them in their mine inventory. One might make a 
case—although I do not—that the significant concern motivating those 
negotiating the 1907 Convention, to achieve an enhanced ability to comply 
with the principle of distinction, provided impetus to develop smarter 
mines than the automatic contact variety dominating mine warfare in the 
early years of the twentieth century. Certainly today mines are very capable 
of identifying even specific ships and can, therefore, be programed not to 
respond to vessels that are protected civilian objects. The motive behind 
the development of influence mines was, however, more to do with creat-
ing a more effective weapon consistent with the principle of war of econ-
omy of effort (not forgetting also, that of surprise!) than it was humanitari-
an (although the two outcomes can certainly chime).  
Despite its shortcomings as a treaty, the 1907 Convention has, over a 
period of more than a century, had an influence on the development of 
customary law on sea mining. Despite the ambiguities inherent in its text 
and its failure adequately to address some important considerations, in par-
ticular those to do with the sea areas in which mining is permitted, when 
the rules in the 1907 Convention are combined with other rules of custom-
ary law (for example, those forming a part of the law of the sea), it is possi-
ble to identify a series of rules that can be applied to sea mines of all levels 
of sophistication. The San Remo Manual contains a useful attempt to do this 
and the Manual’s rules as drafted twenty years ago are obtaining a degree of 
authority, as evidenced by their inclusion in national manuals, such as those 
produced by the United Kingdom and Germany.61 
The 1907 Convention’s rules are currently a part of the mix that has re-
sulted in the San Remo rules. If those rules achieve progressively great au-
thority over time, then one answer to the question to do with the need for 
a new, updated convention is that it is by no means necessary.  An attempt 
by Sweden in 1994 to achieve that by its proposal for a protocol to the 
CCW failed. There is currently no generally articulated need for a develop-
ment in the conventional law. Such developments are, of course, more fre-
                                                                                                                      
61. BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER VERTEIDIGUNG, HUMANITÄRES VÖLKERRECHT IN 
BEWAFFNETEN KONFLIKTEN (2013). 
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quently than not prompted by events that serve to demonstrate the need 
for new treaty law. For the moment, there seems little prospect for this as it 
would probably only materialize as a consequence of a general naval war of 
the like not experienced since 1945. This is despite periodic inconvenienc-
es, such as the mining of the Persian Gulf during both the Iran-Iraq War 
and following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
